Brick Async State Channels
Speakers: Georgia Avarikioti
Transcript By: Bryan Bishop
Brick: Asynchronous State Channels
I am going to be presenting on Brick for asynchronous state channels. This is joint work with my colleagues and my advisor. So far we have heard many things about payment channels and payment channel networks. They were focused on existing channel solutions. In this work, we focus on a different dimensions. We ask why do payment channels work the way they do, can we change the core design of payment channels to address some of the shortcomings. So we go back to the fundamentals of channels. We’ll do a brief introduction again.
Suppose we have Alice and Bob and they want to do transactions on the blockchain without posting the transactions on-chain. The reason for this is because there’s limited space on the blockchain and there’s high transactions. So they can create a joint channel on-chain and then from that point after they can work off-chain. They publish a funding or commitment transaction on-chain and then they can exchange transactions.
Watchtowers act as proxies for the parties that hired them. If the user wants to go offline, then the watchtower will publish relevant data to dispute fraudulent transactions if the counterparty attempts fraud. However, there are attacks that watchtowers can’t defend against. These attacks are based on the synchronicity assumptions of the network. There could be censorship of the fraud-correcting transaction and a channel could be closed in a fraudulent state. This is a major shortcoming of payment channels. They are weaker than transacting on-chain. If you attack liveness on the blockchain, you can delay the inclusion of a transaction and an attacker can steal funds from channels. This all comes back to timing assumptions.
Asynchronous payment channels without timelocks
The idea of Brick is that it’s a new channel primitive that acts a priori. The security of payment channels is usually reactive. You wait for fraud to occur and then you correct it. Brick tries to prevent fraud from happening in the first place. The naive idea would be to move the watchtower into the channel and every time Alice and Bob do a transaction they send to the watchtower and if they want to close the channel they either go to Bob or to the watchtower to get a signature to close.
To increase the fault tolerance of the protocol, we introduce a watchtower committee that we assume has rational members. At most it can handle less than 1/3rd byzantine watchtowers. Alice would collect 2/3rds signatures to close the channel if Bob is not active. This design has some challenges, though. The first problem is that we don’t want to run consensus in the committee because that’s costly and would lower the performance of the channel. Also, privacy is destroyed. Usually payment channels are inherently private since only two parties are transacting. But here every person in the committee sees the balance of the channel which is bad. The third one is that we need to design rational incentives. The whole point of using the blockchain is to not rely on trusted third parties. We need Brick to work under rational conditions.
Channels are already reached agreement on the state. Two parties need to reach agreement, and every state update is totally ordered. We can achieve properties of consensus by using consistent broadcast which is a protocol that has linear communication complexity to the size of the committee. It does not require any communication between the watchtowers. At this point what we do is we have Alice and Bob exchange signatures on the state and they send the state to the watchtowers and they get an acknowledgement from the watchtowers that they received the state. The committee acts as a shared memory for the parties.
We solve the privacy issue by using encryption. The first functionality here is that we don’t really want Alice and Bob to have signatures on every update state. We don’t want them to hold a valid transaction that can be published on chain, otherwise we have the original problem. So we have them change the signatures on the hash, showing they agree on the state but they can’t do anything with this. Every party sends to the watchtower their hash of the state and their signatures proving that they agreed on this state, and then a counter that increments by one. Upon receiving these announcements, the watchtowers check that the counter is incremented, they check the signatures, and then they acknowledge receiving the announcement.
Every time the two parties do an update, they exchange signatures on the hash of the new state. Upon receiving 2f+1 signatures from the watchtowers, they execute the state transition. Closing a brick channel is either in collaboration and they agree and publish a transaction that closes the channel, or one party can go to the committee and request a close. The watchtowers publish online the last stored hash which corresponds to the last update state. As soon as 2f+1 hashes are available, the party can collect the one that has the maximum counter and publishes the state that corresponds to the hash and then the Brick smart contract will close the contract in this space.
Brick security analysis
Assuming we have honest watchtowers, and we’re not yet in the rational model…. first we have to guarantee safety: that the Brick channel won’t close in a previous state. We have 2f+1 watchtowers that solve a previous state, right. Since there are 2f+1 watchtowers that sign the fresh committed state, there are at most f watchtowers that are slow. We need at least one honest watchtower from 2f+1 that has seen the fresh committed state, but chose to close on the previous one, but this is a contradiction because we assume the watchtower is honest. The brick channel is always secure if we assume honest watchtowers.
With a similar argument, we can prove that liveness holds because there will always be an honest watchtower. To have an uncommitted state, then that means a watchtower did not acknowledge a state, and it means one of the operations was invalid. The watchtowers only do verification checks.
To design the incentives for Brick, we need to ask some fundamental questions like why would someone want to be a watchtower. The watchtowers are payment service providers. The only reason they do something is for profit. So we need to pay the watchtowers every time they act on something. Every time we have an update state, we pay a fee to the watchtower. This is not a fair-exchange problem. If Alice sends the fee before receiving the acknowledgement and the watchtower doesn’t respond, then Alice will never send to that watchtower again and we have f for tolerance. The watchtower will decrease if he doesn’t respond. This is the first mechanism.
With this update fee, we still have the problem that the watchtower has no incentive to close because he is only getting paid when the channel is live. So why would a watchtower assist with closing a channel in an honest state- the last committed state. This is the most crucial part. We could use collateral to solve this, but Alice coudl go to the watchtower committee, bribe them and close in a fraudulent state. If we need the counterparty to check this, then we need a timelock and a period where the counterparty has to return online. This is the original problem again. How can we do this with asynchronous channels?
We introduce fraud proofs to the scenario. The idea of a fraud proof is to have two signed conflicting states. Every time a watchtower sends an update of a state, he sends an acknowledgement. You can prove that the watchtower knowingly closed in a previous state. Once you have the fraud proof, you can go to the Brick smart contract and claim the collateral for the watchtower. The collateral must be high enough so that the party will always choose to claim the collateral instead of closing the channel in the wrong state. You must choose between closing the channel in the wrong state, or claiming the collateral. If the collateral is much larger, then we can guarantee a rational user would want the collateral. If we have less than the required number of fraud proofs, then we say that these watchtowers are acting maliciously, we remove them from the protocol and we run the protocol again and as long as we have 2f+1 honest behaving watchtowers, we can close normally.
To show that the party isn’t incentivized to close in an incorrect earlier state, we analyzed the strategy space for what a party can do. So we define the profit function which is how much money the party that is closing the channel will have at the end. This depends on how much money he will get from the channel balance, and how many fraud proofs he will send to the closing smart contract, and how many bribes he will give to watchtowers. The optimal strategy for a rational party would be to get the f fraud proofs from the byzantine watchtowers, they provide the fraud proof for free, then submit to the smart contract, and finally close in the correct state.
The high-level intuiton behind this is that every time we bribe a watchtower, we need to use marginally more than the collateral we would get back. If we use the byzantine watchtowers to close the channels, then we would lose the whole amount of the collateral that we would have been gaining for free.
Watchtowers could collude to hold funds hostage. In this case, we give the watchtowers that publish on chain the hash of the state to close. We give this to 2f+1 watchtowers a closing fee. In this way, we reduce our problem to a prisoner’s dilemma problem.
But what if the parties actually collude to hold the watchtowers hostage? To solve this problem, we increase the committee size to at least size 8. If the committee is size 7, then this means the byzantine watchtowers can be at most 2. The collateral that every watchtower will lock will be v/2 so half the value of the channel. But since we have two parties, one of the parties at every point in time will have at least half the value of the channel. So the richest party will always lose more to lock his funds than what every watchtower will be …. So the richest party is always incentivized to close.
It’s better to have more watchtowers. The first reason is that we have high robustness. The second reason is that we have less collateral per watchtower because we want the collateral to be the same in the sum but it doesn’t depend on the size of the committee. Third and most important, we notice that the cost for the parties remain the same because the main cost for the parties is from the updates, so the update fees. The update fees would logically depend on how much collateral the watchtower is locking in the channel lifetime.
We showed a new channel primitive called Brick. This channel primitive is privacy-preserving, it is incentive-compatible, it has good performance and it’s also asynchronous which means it can withstand liveness attacks such as censorship and congestion.
As before, we need collateral which is going to be true for any incentive-compatible solution with watchtowers and channels. The reason for this is simple. We also prove a lower bound of the collateral and this is the value of the channel. If we have watchtowers that lock less value than in the channel, then a party can make profit by bribing watchtowers and closing the channel and claiming all the money in the channel. We can’t prove security in that case.
We update fees through a one-way channel. The reason we do that is because if we give the fees with a state update, then the two parties can close the channel collaboratively and never give the fees to the watchtower.
We also provide some extensions to Brick: we allow for watchtower replacement. If the watchtower wants to withdraw service before the closing of the channel, he can find a willing candidate and replace his own identity with a new watchtower and then change the collaterals. The other extension we provide is auditability. We present Brick+ for permissioned blockchains… it allows an entity to audit the state history. To do this, we don’t allow the two parties to close the channel in collaboration. We force the parties to close the channels by using the watchtower, otherwise the two parties can collaborate and lie to the auditor.
We can change the way we close the channel and have one-off consensus. Before the close of the channel, the watchtower committee can run a consensus protocols. This makes Brick resilient to forks. Even if an attacker can temporarily attack the persistence of the blockchain, meaning he can fork deep enough into the chain, even in this case Brick remains secure because if we have consensus then the only state we can ever close is the last committed state. That would hold true even if the attacker reverts the closure of the channel because the only available closure state will always be this one.
We have proven Brick security but right now it only holds for two parties. The reason for this is that the closing of the channel with the incentives requires that if more than f fraud proofs are submitted to the Brick smart contract, then we close and we give all the channel balance to the counterparty. Doing this with multiple parties is difficult. We have to find a channel balance at a point, and we need watchtowers that behave honestly. That’s left for future work.
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Disclaimer: These are unpaid transcriptions, performed in real-time and in-person during the actual source presentation. Due to personal time constraints they are usually not reviewed against the source material once published. Errors are possible. If the original author/speaker or anyone else finds errors of substance, please email me at firstname.lastname@example.org for corrections or contribute online via github/git. I sometimes add annotations to the transcription text. These will always be denoted by a standard editor’s note in parenthesis brackets ((like this)), or in a numbered footnote. I welcome feedback and discussion of these as well.
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